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The random switching of measurement bases is commonly assumed to be a necessary step of quantum key
distribution protocols. In this paper we show that switching is not required for coherent state continuous variable
quantum key distribution. We show this via the no-switching protocol which results in higher information
rates and a simpler experimental setup. We propose an optimal eavesdropping attack against this protocol, for
individual Gaussian attacks, and we investigate and compare the no-switching protocol applied to the original
BB84 scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] allows two peo-
ple, Alice and Bob, to communicate in secret, where the laws
of quantum physics insure the total privacy of their communi-
cation. A secret key is generated by Alice transmitting quan-
tum states to Bob, who performs measurements on the re-
ceived states. An eavesdropper, Eve, who actively attacks the
quantum channel, will disturb the quantum system and hence
be detected. A passive eavesdropper, however, whose attack
simulates the quantum channel will remain undetected, but
the maximum information obtainable by this attack is known
and can be bounded. Additionally Eve cannot intercept and
perfectly copy the quantum states as a consequence of the no-
cloning theorem of quantum information [4]. After they have
distilled a secret key, Alice and Bob can use this key to com-
municate secret information over a classical communication
channel.
The first QKD protocol, known as the BB84 protocol, uses
single randomly polarized photon states [2]. Here Alice pre-
pares and sends a random ensemble of single photon states
over a quantum channel to Bob. Bob then measures the states
by randomly switching between two non-commuting mea-
surement bases - a compulsory step to insure the security of
the protocol. Any loss to the environment or noise on the
channel is attributed to Eve, who is only limited in her attack
by the laws of physics. Later Alice and Bob produce a sifted
key by discarding results where their bases are not the same.
Alice and Bob then release a part of their raw key to test for
channel transmission and errors in their correlated bit string.
Reconciliation protocols [5] are employed in order to correct
any errors between Alice and Bob’s correlated key. Finally
privacy amplification [6] is used to reduce Eve’s knowledge
of the key to a negligible amount. Once a secret key has been
generated it is used as a one-time pad [7] to encrypt the mes-
sage. The absolute security of the BB84 protocol has been
proven in [8, 9, 10]. Other single photon schemes proposed
include the EPR protocol [11] and the B92 protocol [12].
QKD using continuous variables was introduced in 1999
[13] as an alternative to the original single photon schemes.
Continuous variable [14] QKD offer the advantages of higher
detection efficiencies, compatibility with current technologies
and faster communication speeds. In 2000, continuous vari-
able QKD using squeezed states [15] and EPR correlations
[16] were proposed. Further work included using squeezed
[17] and coherent states [18] that generated Gaussian keys
against individual Gaussian attacks. All of these protocols
were originally only thought to be secure for line losses less
than 50% or 3dB of noise. However, it has been shown that
this limit can be overcome by using either reverse reconcilia-
tion [19] or post-selection [20] techniques. Reverse reconcili-
ation involves Alice (and Eve) estimating what states Bob has
measured rather than the usual way of Bob (and Eve) trying
to determine what states Alice has sent. In this sense the flow
of classical information is in the reverse direction. The sec-
ond protocol, post-selection, can also tolerate higher losses
by Alice and Bob carefully selecting information for which
they have an advantage over Eve. The unconditional security
of continuous variable QKD has been proven for squeezed
state protocols [21] and Gaussian modulated coherent states
using homodyne detection [22]. Collective attacks using re-
verse reconciliation and their unconditional security was also
discussed in [23]. Continuous variable QKD has also been
experimentally demonstrated in [24, 25, 26].
The random switching of measurement bases by Bob has
been a fundamental step in QKD protocols using both sin-
gle photon states and continuous variables. However recently
we introduced a new coherent state continuous variable QKD
protocol, against individual Gaussian attacks, that does not
require switching. This new protocol, known as the no-
switching protocol, involves Bob measuring both bases simul-
taneously. This was shown to offer higher information rates
along with a simpler experimental setup than protocols that
use switching [27]. Since then the no-switching protocol has
lead to various research, both theoretical [23, 28] and exper-
imental [26]. It was also shown in [23] to be secure against
collective eavesdropping attacks. In this paper we will expand
on our analysis of the no-switching protocol and consider a
more thorough eavesdropping attack. We will also discuss an
equivalent no-switching protocol for discrete variables, in par-
ticular the BB84 protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss
the no-switching protocol for coherent state continuous vari-
able QKD. Section III discusses and compares two physical
realizations of possible eavesdropping attacks. In Section IV
2we discuss an equivalent no-switching protocol for discrete
variables. Section V concludes.
II. THE NO-SWITCHING PROTOCOL
A. Notation
Before leading into the steps of the no-switching protocol
we will first briefly discuss the nomenclature used throughout
this paper. Quantum states that we consider in this paper can
be described using the state vector notation |a〉. These quan-
tum states can be described using the boson field annihilation
operator aˆ which can be expressed in terms of the quadrature
field operators as
aˆ =
1
2
(Xˆ+ + iXˆ−) (1)
where Xˆ+ and Xˆ− are the amplitude (+) and phase (-) quadra-
ture operators respectively. The annihilation operator is not
measurable in itself as it is non-Hermitian. However, we can
express the real and imaginary parts of Eq.(1) as
Xˆ+ = aˆ† + aˆ (2)
Xˆ− = i(aˆ† − aˆ) (3)
which are Hermitian and therefore measurable. These oper-
ators can be expressed in terms of a steady state and a fluc-
tuating component as Xˆ± = 〈Xˆ±〉 + δXˆ± with quadrature
variances defined as V ± = 〈(δXˆ±)2〉. In this paper all op-
erators representing the amplitude and phase observables are
denoted by a hat symbol.
B. No-Switching Protocol
In the original coherent state QKD protocols [17, 18] Al-
ice first prepares a displaced vacuum state that will be sent to
Bob. This is achieved by choosing two real random numbers
S+ and S− from a Gaussian probability distribution with zero
mean 〈S±〉 = 0 and a variance of V ±S = 〈(S±)2〉. She then
displaces the amplitude and phase quadratures of the coherent
state by S+ and S− respectively. The displaced coherent state
can be represented by the state vector |S+ + iS−〉. This state
has corresponding operators Xˆ±A associated with the ampli-
tude and phase observables of the quantum state. So typically
we can express these operators and corresponding quadrature
variances V ±A as
Xˆ±A = S± + Nˆ±A (4)
V ±A = V
±
S + 1 (5)
where Nˆ±A is the operator associated with the amplitude and
phase of the initial vacuum state |0〉, which has a normalized
variance 〈(Nˆ±A )2〉 = 1. Alice transmits this coherent state
to Bob through a quantum channel with a channel transmis-
sion efficiency η. The losses in the channel couples in chan-
nel noise, which have corresponding quadrature operators de-
noted as Xˆ±N (and with corresponding quadrature variances
V ±N ). Therefore the states that arrive at Bob’s station can be
described by the quadrature operators and corresponding vari-
ances
Xˆ±B′ =
√
ηXˆ±A +
√
1− ηXˆN (6)
V ±B′ = ηV
±
A + (1− η)V ±N (7)
where the superscript ’ indicates states entering Bob’s sta-
tion. Once Bob receives these states he does not randomly
switch between measurement quadratures, instead he simul-
taneously measures both the amplitude and phase quadratures
of the state via a 50/50 beamsplitter and a pair of homodyne
detectors. We denote Bob’s quadrature measurements by Xˆ±B
with a quadrature variance of V ±B , which can be expressed as
Xˆ±B =
1√
2
(
√
ηXˆ±A +
√
1− ηXˆ±N + Nˆ±B ) (8)
V ±B =
1
2
(ηV ±A + (1− η)V ±N + 1). (9)
where Nˆ±B is the vacuum noise entering into Bob’s 50/50
quantum channel
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FIG. 1: Schematic of a coherent state continuous variable QKD
scheme using the no-switching protocol. AM: amplitude modulator,
PM: phase modulator; S±: random Gaussian numbers; Xˆ±
A
: Alice’s
prepared state; η: channel transmission; Xˆ±
N
: channel noise; Xˆ±
B′
:
describes the states entering Bob’s station; Nˆ±
B
: Bob’s vacuum noise;
XˆB : describes the states Bob measures after the beamsplitter.
beamsplitter with a variance 〈(Nˆ±B )2〉 = 1. Figure 1 gives a
schematic of the no-switching coherent state QKD protocol.
As a point of interest it has been shown [29] that simultane-
ously measuring both quadratures is equivalent to an optimal
quantum cloner for continuous variable Gaussian states, i.e.
a cloning machine that produces two quantum clones with an
optimal fidelity ofF = 2/3. So the no-switching protocol can
also be thought of as an optimal cloning protocol where Bob
(and, as we shall see, Eve) optimally clones their respective
quantum states.
A consequence of the no-switching protocol is that vacuum
noise is introduced into Bob’s measurements via the 50/50
beamsplitter at his station. In the following sections we an-
alyze the effect of this extra quanta of noise introduced into
Bob’s quadrature measurements in terms of secret key rate
3and the overall security of the protocol. We will show that it
is still secure against individual attacks and it results in higher
information rates as a result of obtaining two simultaneous
streams of information from both quadratures, instead of the
usual one quadrature measurement.
C. Mutual Information
In analyzing QKD protocols we are inevitably concerned
with the net mutual information [30, 31] between Alice and
Bob in the presence of Eve, i.e. the rate at which a secret key
can be generated by Alice and Bob. In this paper we consider
that Alice and Bob use the reverse reconciliation protocol to
generate a secret key [19]. For the reverse reconciliation pro-
tocol the net information rate can be written as
∆I = I(B : A)− I(B : E) (10)
where I(B : A) is the mutual information between Bob and
Alice and similarly between Bob and Eve, I(B : E). We can
define these quantities as
I(B : A) = H(B)−H(B|A) (11)
I(B : E) = H(B)−H(B|E) (12)
where H(B) is Bob’s Shannon entropy and H(B|A) and
H(B|E) are Alice’s and Eve’s conditional entropies relative
to Bob’s measurement [31] respectively. The conditional en-
tropy is a measure of how uncertain Alice and Eve are, on av-
erage, about Bob’s measurement result. These quantities can
physically be thought of as noise, due to the quantum chan-
nel and the intrinsic quantum noise of Alice’s state. For the
no-switching protocol, Alice encodes independent informa-
tion onto both quadratures of a coherent state, which Bob then
simultaneously measures. Subsequently we can describe the
mutual information rate between Alice and Bob as the sum of
the quadrature information rates as
∆I = ∆I+ +∆I− (13)
where ∆I+ is the information rate for the amplitude quadra-
ture and ∆I− the information rate for the phase quadrature.
By substituting Eqs.(11,12) into Eq.(10) and assuming sym-
metry for both quadratures, we end up with the information
rate for the no-switching protocol given by
∆I = 2[H(B|E)−H(B|A)] (14)
Hence, in order to determine the final information rate, we
need to determine both Alice’s and Eve’s conditional en-
tropies.
D. Conditional Variances
We can express Alice’s and Eve’s conditional entropies of
Bob’s quadrature measurements in terms of conditional vari-
ances [30]
H(B|A) = 1
2
log2(VA|B) (15)
H(B|E) = 1
2
log2(VE|B) (16)
where VA|B and VE|B are Alice’s and Eve’s conditional vari-
ances relative to Bob’s measurement respectively [32]. The
conditional variance can be thought of as the uncertainty in
Alice’s and Eve’s estimates of Bob’s quadrature measurement
result. In general the conditional variance of X given the event
Y can be written as
VX|Y = var(X |Y ) = min
g
〈(Y − gX)2〉 (17)
where g is an optimal gain that minimizes the conditional
variance. Therefore, the total information rate for the no-
switching protocol given in Eq.(14), assuming symmetry of
both quadratures, can be written in a simpler form in terms of
conditional variances as
∆I = log2
(VE|B
VA|B
)
(18)
E. Alice’s Conditional Variance
For the no-switching protocol Alice’s conditional variance
of Bob’s measurements is defined as
V ±
A|B = min
g
±
A
〈(Xˆ±B − g±AS±)2〉 (19)
where Xˆ±B is Bob’s quadrature measurement given by Eq. (8),S± is the quadrature displacement of Alice’s prepared state
and g±A is an experimental gain or Alice’s best estimate at what
Bob has measured. This gain is then optimized to give a min-
imum conditional variance. The minimum gain is given by
g±A = 〈S±Xˆ±B 〉/〈S±2〉 which is then substituted into Eq. (19)
to give a conditional variance of
V ±
A|B = V
±
B −
〈S±X±B 〉2
V ±S
(20)
We now calculate Alice’s conditional variances for the no-
switching protocol. To calculate the conditional variances we
consider a more general protocol, where Alice can transmit
to Bob displaced squeezed states instead of coherent states.
This scenario leads to the best possible correlation between
Alice and Bob for a particular quadrature measurement. In
this case, the quadrature variance of the states prepared by Al-
ice are given by
V ±A = V
±
S + V
±
sqz (21)
where V ±sqz is the quadrature variance of the squeezed states
prepared by Alice. To ensure that the quadrature variances
of Alice’s transmitted state remains symmetric with variances
V ±A , we require that the maximum amount of squeezing is
4limited by the variance of Alice’s transmitted states. This is
given by the following inequality
V ∓sqz ≥
1
V ±A
(22)
Substituting Eq.(9) into Eq.(20), with 〈S±X±B 〉 =
√
η/2V ±S ,
we can calculate Alice’s conditional variance to be
V ±
A|B =
1
2
(
ηV ±sqz + (1− η)V ±N + 1
)
(23)
where we have used the fact that V ±S = V
±
A − V ±sqz from
Eq.(21). We point out that in the no-switching protocol Al-
ice does not actually use squeezed states but rather coherent
states. So eventually we will set V ±sqz = 1. We only con-
sider that Alice uses squeezing for our analysis in order to
give lower bounds for the quadrature conditional variances.
F. Uncertainty Relations
Before we explicitly calculate Eve’s conditional variance
we first derive a general relationship between Alice’s and
Eve’s conditional variances. We will then use this relation to
bound Eve’s minimum conditional variance and hence Eve’s
maximum mutual information with Bob. To calculate a rela-
tionship between Alice’s and Eve’s conditional variances of
Bob’s measurement, V ∓
E|B and V
±
A|B , we define the operators
that denote Alice’s and Eve’s inference of Bob’s measurement
before his beamsplitter, expressed as
Xˆ±
E|B′ = Xˆ
±
B′ − g±EXˆ±E (24)
Xˆ∓
A|B′ = Xˆ
∓
B′ − g∓AS∓ (25)
where g±EXˆ
±
E and g
∓
AS∓ are Alice’s and Eve’s optimal esti-
mates with optimal gains, g±E and g
∓
A . Finding the commuta-
tor of the above two equations, and using the fact that different
Hilbert spaces commute, we find that
[Xˆ+
E|B′ , Xˆ
−
A|B′ ] = [Xˆ
+
B′ , Xˆ
−
B′ ] = 2i (26)
This leads to [33] the joint Heisenberg uncertainty relation
V ±
E|B′V
∓
A|B′ ≥ 1 (27)
Therefore, there is a limit to what Alice and Eve can know
simultaneously about what Bob has measured. Once again an
important notational point is the superscript ′. Whenever this
is used it implies that the equations are only dealing with the
states before Bob’s beamsplitter. From the above inequality
it is possible to determine the maximum information Eve can
obtain about the state in terms of Alice’s conditional variances
V ±
A|B .
G. Eve’s Conditional Variance
We now calculate Eve’s minimum conditional variance for
an attack which is only limited by the joint Heisenberg uncer-
tainty relation given in Eq. (27) and Alice’s conditional vari-
ance in Eq. (23). To find a lower bound on Eve’s conditional
variance, we first consider her inference of Bob’s state prior
to the 50/50 beamsplitter in Bob’s station. As with Alice’s
conditional variance, Eve’s conditional variance is given by
V ±
E|B′ = min
g
±
E
〈(Xˆ±B′ − g
′±
E Xˆ
±
E )
2〉 (28)
where Xˆ±B′ (defined in Eq. (32)) is the quadrature of Bob’s
state that could be measured prior to the beamsplitter and the
associated gain g
′±
E . Eve’s measurement variance after the
beamsplitter conditioned on Bob’s measurement (V ±
E|B) can
be expressed in terms of the conditional variance before the
beamsplitter (V ±
E|B′) as
V ±
E|B =
〈(
Xˆ±B − g±EXˆ±E
)2〉
=
〈(
1√
2
(Xˆ±B + Nˆ
±
B )− g±EXˆ±E
)2〉
=
1
2
〈(
Xˆ±B −
√
2g±EXˆ
±
E
)2〉
+
1
2
=
1
2
〈(
Xˆ±B − g
′±
E Xˆ
±
E
)2〉
+
1
2
=
1
2
(
V ±
E|B′ + 1
)
(29)
where we have used the fact that Eve has no access to the
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FIG. 2: (a) Net information rates for the no-switching (i) and switch-
ing (ii) protocols as a function of channel efficiency; where V ±
N
= 1
and V ±
A
= 100. Two eavesdropping attacks are given by the same
solid curve (iii). (b) Contour plot of the information rate for the no-
switching protocol as a function of channel efficiency and channel
noise.
beamsplitter in Bob’s station, and therefore has no knowledge
of the vacuum entering through it. The uncertainty relation
Eq.(27) tells us that there is a limit to what Alice and Eve
can simultaneously know about what Bob has measured, i.e.
V ∓
E|B′
≥ 1/V ±
A|B′
. We can now determine Alice’s conditional
5variance of Bob, if Bob were to directly measure a single
quadrature of his state before the 50/50 beamsplitter V ±
A|B′ .
The derivation of V ±
A|B′ is based on the derivation given in
[19] which goes as follows. We can use Eq.(20) with the fol-
lowing equations
S± = Xˆ±A − Nˆ±A (30)
V ±S = V
±
A − V ±sqz (31)
Xˆ±B′ =
√
ηXˆ±A +
√
1− ηXˆ±N (32)
V ±B′ = ηV
±
A + (1− η)V ±N (33)
〈S±Xˆ±B′〉 =
√
ηV ±S (34)
The above equations are the same as the no-switching equa-
tions, e.g. Eqs.(8,9), except for the 1/√2 and Nˆ±B that are due
to Bob’s simultaneous quadrature measurements. Alice’s con-
ditional variance using reverse reconciliation with switching is
given by
V ±
A|B′ ≥ V ±A|B′min = (η/V ±A + (1− η)V ±N ) (35)
Using this minimum value with Eq.(27) we can calculate
Eve’s conditional variance when switching is used
V ±
E|B′
≥ (η/V ±A + (1− η)V ±N )−1. (36)
Again we emphasize that we have assumed that Eve can si-
multaneously measure both the amplitude and phase quadra-
tures of her ancilla (or measuring) state without paying a
“quantum duty”. This is in fact an unphysical assumption that
allows Eve more information than what she is entitled to. We
calculate a lower bound on Eve’s conditional variance for the
no-switching protocol by substituting Eq. (36) into Eq. (29)
V ±
E|B ≥
1
2
(( η
V ±A
+ (1− η)V ±N
)−1
+ 1
)
. (37)
H. Secret Key Rate
We can now determine the final secret key rate for the
no-switching protocol by substituting Alice’s and Eve’s con-
ditional variances from Eqs. (23, 37) (and symmetrize both
quadratures) into Eq.(18). The final secret key rate is then
given by
∆I ≥ log2
(( η
VA
+ (1 − η)VN )−1 + 1
η + (1− η)VN + 1
)
(38)
where we have set V ±sqz = 1 to indicate that we are using
coherent states. Figure 2(b) shows a plot of Eq. (38) for vary-
ing channel transmissions and varying channel noise. We see
that it is completely secure for vacuum noise and as the noise
is increased the insecure region gets larger (as is the case for
all QKD protocols). Figure 2(a) plots the information rate
of Eq. (38) (for V ±N = 1 and V ±A = 100) against the chan-
nel transmission (dashed line). We can now compare the no-
switching protocol (dashed line) to the switching protocol (dot
dashed line) of [19]. Figure 2 shows that the no-switching pro-
tocol has a higher information rate than the switching protocol
for all channel transmission losses.
We now turn our attention to physical implementations of
eavesdropping attacks against the no-switching protocol and
compare these attacks to the bound derived in Eq. (38).
III. EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
In the previous section we derived an upper bound on Eve’s
maximum information for the the no-switching protocol. In
this section we put a lower bound on Eve’s information by in-
vestigating a physical eavesdropping attack. A feed-forward
scheme was discussed in [27] as a possible eavesdropping at-
tack to the no-switching protocol for varying channel noise
(i.e. not just vacuum noise). Here Eve used a beamsplitter
to gather information from the quantum channel (see Fig. 3a).
She then measured both quadratures simultaneously and then
feed forward these altered states onto Bob. We denote this
attack as the coherent feed-forward attack. We will now con-
sider a more sophisticated attack that incorporates additional
entanglement. We show that by giving Eve additional re-
sources, e.g. the use of entanglement, that she gets no ad-
ditional information compared to the coherent feed-forward
attack. We then discuss reasons for thinking that the coherent
feed-forward attack might be optimal for individual Gaussian
attacks.
A. Entanglement Feed-Forward Attack
Figure 3b shows a schematic of the entanglement feed-
forward attack. This attack goes as follows: Eve creates two
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [34] entangled beams by in-
terfering two squeezed beams Xˆ±sqz1 and Xˆ±sqz2 on a 50/50
beamsplitter. The quadratures of the entangled beams are de-
scribed by the following operators
Xˆ±epr1 =
1√
2
(Xˆ±sqz1 + Xˆ
±
sqz2) (39)
Xˆ±epr2 =
1√
2
(Xˆ±sqz1 − Xˆ±sqz2) (40)
Eve retains the second of the entangled beams Xˆ±epr2, which
she simultaneously measures both quadratures via a 50/50
beamsplitter and two perfect homodyne detectors. We assume
that Eve has quantum memory and that she performs these
measurements only after Bob has receives the states. These re-
sulting quadrature operators and corresponding variances are
given by
Xˆ±E1 =
(Xˆ±sqz1 − Xˆ±sqz2)/
√
2− Nˆ±E1√
2
(41)
V ±E1 =
(V ±sqz1 + V
±
sqz2 + 2)
4
(42)
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FIG. 3: Schematic of two possible eavesdropping attacks: (a) Coher-
ent feed-forward attack and (b) entanglement feed-forward attack.
where Nˆ±E1 is the vacuum noise entering into Eve’s first beam-
splitter with 〈(Nˆ±E1)2〉 = 1. Eve then injects the entangled
beam Xˆ±epr1 into a beamsplitter with a transmission efficiency
ǫ to simulate channel losses. Eve then simultaneously mea-
sures both quadratures of the output beam of the beamsplit-
ter, with quadrature operators and corresponding variances ex-
pressed as
Xˆ±E2 =
(√1− ǫ
2
Xˆ±A +
√
ǫ
2
(Xˆ±sqz1 + Xˆ
±
sqz2) +
Nˆ±E2√
2
)
V ±E2 = ((1− ǫ)V ±A +
ǫ
2
(V ±sqz1 + V
±
sqz2) + 1)/2 (43)
where Nˆ±E2 is the vacuum noise entering into Eve’s second
beamsplitter with 〈(Nˆ±E2)2〉 = 1. Using lossless electro-
optic feed-forward techniques, Eve transfers the measured
photocurrents back onto the quantum channel with some gain
g±E . The gain of this feed-forward must be chosen to en-
sure that the magnitude of the signal detected by Bob re-
mains invariant. So for an arbitrary channel transmission η,
Bob would be expecting a signal described by the quadra-
ture operator √η Xˆ±A due to losses in the quantum chan-
nel. Now Eve knows that she is sending Bob a signal of√
ǫ Xˆ±A + g
±
E
√
(1− ǫ)/2 Xˆ±A . Therefore she wants
√
η Xˆ±A
to equal
√
ǫ Xˆ±A + g
±
E
√
(1 − ǫ)/2 Xˆ±A . This leads to a gain
of
g±E =
√
2(
√
η −√ǫ)√
1− ǫ (44)
We point out that this is the same gain as given for the coher-
ent feed-forward attack [27]. Now because Eve has reduced
the transmission of the quantum channel, she will need to add
additional Gaussian noise N± (with variance V ±N ) to remain
undetected (which she can subsequently infer out of her esti-
mate of Bob’s quadrature measurement with arbitrary preci-
sion). Once Bob receives these altered quantum states from
Eve, he then measures both quadratures simultaneously
Xˆff
±
B = [
√
ǫXˆ±A −
√
(1− ǫ)/2(Xˆ±sqz1 + Xˆ±sqz2)
+ Nˆ±B +N± + g(
√
1− ǫXˆ±A (45)
+
√
ǫ/2(Xˆ±sqz1 + Xˆ
±
sqz2) + Nˆ
±
E2)
√
2]
√
2
This has a corresponding variance of
V ff
±
B = ηV
±
A /2 + V
±
N /2− [2 + V ±sqz1 + V ±sqz2
− 2√ηǫ(2 + V ±sqz1 + V ±sqz2) + 2η (46)
+ ηǫ(V ±sqz1 + V
±
sqz2)]/(4ǫ− 4)
We are now in a position to calculate Eve’s conditional vari-
ance V ff±
E1,E2|B for this entanglement feed-forward attack, as a
function of the beamsplitter transmission ǫ. Once we have cal-
culated this conditional variance we can then proceed as be-
fore to determine the secret key rate. The conditional variance
in this case will be a tripartite conditional variance defined as
V ff±
E1,E2|B = 〈(Xˆ±B − g±1 Xˆ±E1 − g±2 Xˆ±E2)2〉 (47)
as we need to accommodate both of Eve’s measurements in
her estimate of Bob’s quadrature measurements. Minimizing
the two gains, we have
V ±
E1,E2|B = V
±
B −
V ±E1〈Xˆ±B Xˆ±E2〉2 + V ±E2〈Xˆ±B Xˆ±E1〉2
V ±E1V
±
E2 − 〈Xˆ±E1Xˆ±E2〉2
+
2〈Xˆ±B Xˆ±E1〉〈Xˆ±B Xˆ±E2〉〈Xˆ±E1Xˆ±E2〉
V ±E1V
±
E2 − 〈Xˆ±E1Xˆ±E2〉2
(48)
The above equation is a function of the two channel transmis-
sions η and ǫ. To calculate one in terms of the other we need
to consider how much information Eve is allowed to have be-
fore she is detected by Alice and Bob. This is related by the
following inequality
(1− η)V ±N ≥
(
(V ±sqz1 + V
±
sqz2 + 2ǫ)
− 2√ǫη(2 + V ±sqz1 + V ±sqz2 (49)
+ η(2 + ǫ(V ±sqz1 + V
±
sqz2)))
)
/2(1− ǫ)
7where the left hand side is the amount of noise for an arbi-
trary quantum channel. This noise must be greater than or
equal to the total noise Eve has put onto the channel (as can
be seen from Eq. (45)). We numerically minimize V ff±
E1,E2|B
for all ǫ between ǫmin and ǫmax. Alice’s conditional variance
remains the same as before (i.e. Eq.(23)) as Eve has applied
the correct gain. Now that we have Eve’s and Alice’s condi-
tional variances we can use Eq.(18) to numerically calculate
the secret key rate. We find that the secret key rate for the en-
tanglement feed-forward attack is the same as the secret key
rate for the coherent feed-forward attack.
In Fig. 2 we plot both the entanglement feed-forward at-
tack and the coherent feed-forward attack (both the same top
solid line). We conjecture that this higher bound is in fact
the optimal bound for the no-switching protocol against indi-
vidual attacks. In principle the best Eve can do is to optimally
clone the states she intercepted from Alice and then send these
cloned copies back onto Bob - which is exactly what the co-
herent feed-forward attack does. Also by giving Eve more
resources, such as entanglement, does not in any way give her
an information advantage. This suggests we have found an
optimal information bound.
IV. BB84 AND THE NO-SWITCHING PROTOCOL
As we have seen, the no-switching protocol works success-
fully in the continuous variable regime using coherent states.
It eliminates the need to randomly switch bases resulting in
simplicity and higher information rates. We now ask the ques-
tion: can the no-switching protocol be applied to the discrete
variable regime and give the same benefits? To determine if
this happens we consider an equivalent no-switching protocol
for single photon states. This involves introducing a quan-
tum cloning machine in Bob’s station that allows him to im-
perfectly clone (due to the no-cloning theorem [4]) what Al-
ice has sent into two sets of copies. Bob can then measure
both polarization bases simultaneously. This cloning machine
will negate the need for Bob to randomly switch measurement
bases. As a note, there have been other discrete variable pro-
posals that do not rely on the random switching of measure-
ment bases but rather the random switching of state manipu-
lation, such as the “ping pong” protocol [36].
A. How the No-Switching Protocol for BB84 Works
Alice sends a random ensemble of linearly polarized pho-
tons to Bob. These photons are from a set of 4 possible po-
larizations: horizontal (H) ≡ |0〉, vertical (V) ≡ |1〉, diagonal
(D)≡ (|0〉+|1〉)/√2 and anti-diagonal (A)≡ (|0〉−|1〉)/√2.
Bob then uses a quantum cloning machine [35] that takes one
input state and outputs two identical clones. Bob can there-
fore measure the first set of clones with the rectilinear bases
and the other set with the diagonal bases. This guarantees that
Bob always measures in the correct basis. The classical steps
of reconciliation and privacy amplification follows. Figure 4
gives an illustration of the protocol.
(a)
(c)
(b)
H / V
D / A
B
Bob's Quantum Cloner
Universal
 Cloning
Machine
Bob
B
Alice
A
H ADV
b2
b3
b1
b2
b3
FIG. 4: The steps of the BB84 scheme using the no-switching pro-
tocol. (a) Alice sends to Bob a random ensemble of photons chosen
from 4 possible polarizations. (b) Bob clones the incoming photons
from Alice using a universal quantum cloning machine. This pro-
duces the two clones b2 and b3. (c) Bob then measures one clone in
the horizontal/vertical basis (H/V) and the other clone in the diago-
nal/antidiagonal (D/A) basis. After communicating classically with
Alice, Bob can then discard those times where he used the wrong
basis.
B. Bob’s Quantum Cloning Machine
We assume that Bob has a universal quantum cloning ma-
chine at his station. This enables him to clone with a max-
imum fidelity of 5/6 or ≈ 83% of the original input state.
The universal quantum cloning machine is state independent
so will copy any input state with the same fidelity. Therefore
it is suited to QKD as there is no prior knowledge of which of
the four polarization states Alice has sent.
To illustrate how the universal quantum cloner works we
suppose that Bob wants to copy an arbitrary pure state |ψ1〉 =
α|0〉+β|1〉 (this pure state corresponds to any one of the four
photon polarizations). In our protocol Bob’s inputs a given
qubit b1 into his cloning machine which outputs the identical
clones b2 and b3. Here the state of the cloning machine is
given by |C〉b. Bob wants to copy the bases |0〉 and |1〉 of
the arbitrary pure state. This initial preparation by Bob of his
8cloning machine is given by
|0〉|0〉|C〉b (50)
|1〉|0〉|C〉b (51)
where |0〉 is the blank state (e.g. the blank paper in copying
machines) that is used to make the clones with. The resulting
output of the cloning machine in Eqs. (50,51) is given by [35]
−→
√
2
3
|00〉| ↑〉+
√
1
6
|+〉| ↓〉 (52)
−→
√
2
3
|11〉| ↓〉+
√
1
6
|+〉| ↑〉 (53)
where |+〉 = (|10〉)+|01〉)/√2 and | ↑〉 and | ↓〉 represent the
output states of the quantum cloning machine. The resulting
clones are identical, with each being of worse quality than the
original qubit that Bob used as the input state. We are then
able to perform a partial trace over the cloning machine states
which allows us to look at any subsystem of the original den-
sity operator. After performing a partial trace over the cloning
machines we are left with a density operator describing the
two output clones ρˆoutb2b3 . To find the density operator of either
of the two clones individually, we can perform a partial trace
over either of the two clones. The resulting reduced density
operator can then be written as
ρˆoutb2 =
5
6
|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ 1
6
|ψ2〉〈ψ2| (54)
where |ψ1〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 and |ψ2〉 = β|0〉−α|1〉. Eq.(54) is
equal to the other density operator ρˆoutb3 due to the symmetry
of the system. Eq. (54) tells us that the clones comprise of
5/6 of the original input state and 1/6 of the errors of the uni-
versal quantum cloning machine. Therefore by having these
clones of the original states sent by Alice, Bob can abandon
switching and measure both bases at the same time.
C. Information Rate
Finally to determine whether the no-switching protocol
works in the BB84 case we again need to consider informa-
tion rates. Unlike the continuous variable information rates
we previously used, we now need to use a (discrete) binary
symmetric channel given by [30]
IAB = 1+ pelog2pe + (1− pe)log2(1 − pe) (55)
where pe is the error probability between Alice and Bob’s
mutual information. In the normal switching BB84 protocol
(where we neglect Eve for the moment), Alice and Bob have
an error probability of 25%. However after key sifting,where
they discard incorrect basis measurements, they have zero er-
ror probability leading to IAB = 1 bits/signal. But in actual
fact IAB = 0.5 bits/signal as Alice and Bob have, on aver-
age, thrown away half of their original data in the classical
communication step.
D. To Switch Or Not To Switch
In our no-switching protocol for the BB84 protocol we have
an error probability of 1/6 or ≈ 17% (from Bob’s cloning
machine), compared with an error rate of zero for the BB84
protocol, after Alice and Bob discard the results for the in-
correct measurement basis. Substituting this 17% error into
Eq.(55) gives an information rate of IAB = 0.35 bits/signal.
This information rate is slower than the IAB = 0.5 bits/signal
for the BB84 protocol and thus it is more beneficial to use the
original BB84 scheme. It is important to note that the 17%
error is from Bob’s station and not the quantum channel (i.e.
not from Eve’s tampering). Normally an error rate of 17%
from the quantum channel is too high and would mean that
Bob and Alice would not be able to distill a secure key. In
our case, before Bob starts cloning, he and Alice can test the
quantum channel for eavesdropping and provided it is below
a safe threshold, Bob can continue cloning. In any event ran-
domly switching the measurement bases when using discrete
variable QKD gives a higher information rate than using the
no-switching protocol.
V. CONCLUSION
Quantum key distribution has long made use of the random
switching of measurement bases to ensure the security of the
protocol. We have shown that switching is not a necessary
requirement for coherent state continuous variable quantum
key distribution. This was demonstrated via the no-switching
protocol. The no-switching protocol gives higher information
rates than protocols that use switching and also offers a sim-
pler experimental setup.
We investigated a physical implementation of the eaves-
dropping scheme in the form of an entangling feed-forward
attack. We showed that this attack was no more effective than
a simpler coherent feed-forward attack that did not use entan-
glement. We then conjectured that the coherent feed-forward
attack was the optimal attack assuming individual Gaussian
attacks.
Finally we have shown that there is no advantage by apply-
ing the no-switching protocol to the original BB84 protocol
which employs single photon states. This is an interesting re-
sult as it highlights the differences between QKD with single
photon states compared to continuous variables.
We would like to thank T. Williams and D. Pulford for use-
ful discussions, and the financial support of the Australian Re-
search Council and the Australian Department of Defence.
[1] S.Wiesner, SIGACT News 15, 78 (1983). [2] C.H. Bennett and G.Brassard, in Proceedings IEEE Interna-
9tional Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Proceed-
ings (Bangalore) (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[3] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W.Tittel, and H.Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys.
74, 145 (2002).
[4] W.K. Wooters and W.H. Zurek, Nature 299, 802 (1982);
[5] U.M Maurer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 39, 733 (1993); G. Bras-
sard and L. Salvail, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT93,
Lecture Notes Computer Science Vol. 765 (Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1994), pp. 411 423.
[6] C. H. Bennett et al., IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 41, 1915 (1995).
[7] G.S. Vernam, J.Am.Inst. Electr. Eng. 45, 109 (1926).
[8] D. Mayers, quant-ph/9802025, (1998).
[9] H.K. Lo and H.F. Chau, Science 283, 2050-2056, (1999).
[10] P.W. Shor and J.Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441-444, (2000).
[11] A.K. Ekert Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[12] C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. , 68 3121 (1992).
[13] T.C Ralph, Phys. Rev. A 61, 010303(R) (1999).
[14] S.L. Braunstein and P.V. Loock, Rev. Mod. Phys. 77, 513-577
(2005); quant-ph/0410100 (2004).
[15] M.Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 61, 022309 (2000).
[16] M.D. Reid, Phys. Rev. A 62, 062308 (2000).
[17] N.J. Cerf, M. Levy, and G. Van Assche, Phys. Rev. A 63,
052311 (2001).
[18] F. Grosshans and Ph. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 057902
(2002).
[19] F. Grosshans, and Ph. Grangier, quant-ph/0204127 (2002).
[20] C.Silberhorn, T.C. Ralph, N.Lutkenhaus, G.Leuchs, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[21] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. A 63, 022309 (2001).
[22] S. Iblisdir, G. Van Assche, and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. . 93,
170502 (2004).
[23] F. Grosshans , Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 020504 (2005).
[24] F. Grosshans et al, Nature 421, 238 (2003).
[25] S. Lorenz, N. Korolkova, G. Leuchs, Appl. Phys. B, 79, 273
(2004).
[26] A. Lance et al, quant-ph/0504004, (2005).
[27] C. Weedbrook et al, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504 (2004);
quant-ph/0405105, (2004).
[28] R. Filip, L. Mista, and P. Marek, Phys. Rev. A 71, 012323
(2005).
[29] P.T. Cochrane, T.C Ralph and A. Dolinska, Phys. Rev. A 69,
042313 (2004).
[30] C.E. Shannon, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27, 623 (1948).
[31] M.A. Nielsen and I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[32] Grangier, Ph., Levenson, J.A. & Poizat, J.-Ph. Quantum
non-demolition measurements in optics. Nature 396, 537-542
(1998).
[33] J.J. Sakurai, Modern Quantum Mechanics (Addison-Wesley
New York, 1994).
[34] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N.Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47, 777
(1935).
[35] V. Buzek and M.Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1844 (1996).
[36] K. Bostroem and T. Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902
(2002).
